

6-11?

The Armageddon Secret

Working Outline

Introduction

--325 million; that paper never should have existed; it still does, protected by secrecy system; we must challenge that secrecy system, and the policies it protects; this book aims to be a first step in doing so.

Chapter 1: The Bundy Briefing

--Bundy briefing; how did I come to know this information?

Chapter 2: Deterrence Theory, RAND and the Missile Gap

--from Wallace supporter to Cold Warrior: Berlin, Prague, Jewish doctors, Hiss (Jowett, Chambers, Alastair Cooke), Korea (Left develops credibility gap, for me); I believe Truman, Acheson.

--from labor economist (unions purged; give up on Operation Dixie; welfare funds, corruption; Taft-Hartley) or writer? see Bergler, "accuser of parents"; my stories in Advocate, but anonymous: Andrew Hunt) to theorist, game/decision theory ("You'll never finish that!"); thesis on Uncertainty. Goodwin: RAND, math, my profile in Crimson.

--Summer at Stanford, probability theory with Suppes (SSRC); visit to RAND (Goodwin had mentioned it; interest in game theory)

Game theory, decision theory; Sputnik, obsession with competition with Russians, ICBM test, missile gap (in fall); Bargaining theory; power.

--Summer 1958: Consultant, RAND Corporation; seminar on strategy: AJW, Kahn, Marshall, Rowen: "You're absolutely wrong.";

Missile/bomber/deterrent gap. R-290, R-266. Expectation of attack or crisis. (Enthoven and I don't sign up for TIAA/CREF); the Delicate Balance of Terror (early 1959?): second strike vs. first strike capability; focus on Soviet surprise attack (Roberta Wohlstetter study of Pearl Harbor and Decision: ambiguity of warning, impact of this).

Introduction to secrecy: violations. Reading D's, RM's. Hair-raising, late at night.

✓ Memo on unauthorized action (recollections of my own plans in Med) and need for "safety

lock" (Carne). [WEB]

✓ --Expounding on missile gap, danger of surprise attack, at Society, elsewhere (debates with Everett Mendelsohn)

✓ Writing and giving Lowell Lectures on Art of Coercion. Princeton: Woodrow Wilson Institute; Klaus Knorr; Glen Snyder... Seminars for Henry Kissinger on Political Uses of Madness.

--I join the RAND Corporation.

✓ I pass up chance to go to Vienna Conference for Steinem: clearance worries. I seek advice from Melman, who says: "I'm working for life, you're working for death." Mark Leiserson, my tutor from Harvard: "You're selling out." "I'd work for free. I'd pay."

More on early days at RAND

✗ **Chapter 3: The Pacific War Plan**

✗ **Chapter 4: Delegation (I)**

✗ **Chapter 5: Kunsan**

✗ **Chapter 7: Iwakuni (I)**

✗ **Chapter 8: The JSCP (I)**

✗ **Chapter 9: Delegation (II)**

✗ **Chapter 10: The JSCP (II)**

✗ **Chapter 11: The BNSP**

✓ --On basis of my BNSP draft, signed by McNamara as SecDef Guidance on War Plans, I help Enthoven define Options, and draft directive to CINCSAC from McNamara on immediate changes in current plans (with help of Lukeman)

Chapter 12: Task Force on Limited War RDT&E

--Guantanamo (2d Fleet plans for invasion of Cuba, after Bay of Pigs!);

*What I didn't know:
missile, nuclear plan*

--Continued focus on deterrent gap.

✓ USAF study: "Stop the world..." "Could I be in the wrong line of work?"

✓ Enthoven arranges a luncheon with McNamara for me (when Kershaw tells me, "Nobody here knows anything about Gilpatric). Yarmolinsky: "I've never heard him talk so frankly with anyone. You must never tell anyone what you've heard here today ("There's no such thing as limited nuclear war...")...that means Harry Rowen..."

Chapter 13: The End of the Missile Gap

- ✗ --Visit to SAC Headquarters (see draft), "If worst comes to worst, only ten million dead";
- ✓ --Berlin Game (Chayes: "We've got to get out of Berlin");
- ✓ --Acheson Study with Wohlstetter (Carol can't understand) Acheson Report ("must be ready to use nuclear weapons") (threat);
[NOTES ON WEB]
- ✓ --new ^{Kayser Plan} NIE, end of missile gap ("These pictures are worth a billion dollars"; "That's about what they cost");
- ✗ --I brief this to RAND, Top Secret: "Yes, Virginia, there is a missile gap...10x1 in our favor." No one believes me. (I can't tell basis; they're not cleared. For that matter, neither am I.)
- ✓ --I propose that JFK reveal this to Khrushchev; rejected, along with my draft speech for JFK done for Yarmolinsky;
[WEB]
- ✓ --Gilpatric speech (published accounts all wrong): I give draft to Tim Stanley for Gilpatric; ("Our second-strike capability is greater than they can deliver in their first strike"; "Is that true?" "Trust me"); speech delivered, denounced by Malinovsky and Khrushchev; but threat to Berlin removed, or postponed (actually, says Hersh/Garthoff, this was done earlier: so Gilpatric speech appears to be our answer to this! Horelick and Rush conclude this was major step toward deployment of missiles to Cuba. [Thus, I appear to end Berlin crisis of 1961, at least that was what I was trying to do and the crisis did end; but I contribute to missile crisis of 1962! And I inadvertently make a first-use threat, which I don't recognize or admit to myself for over 30 years).
- ✓ --What doesn't occur to me is to reveal the true situation to Congress (dominated by conservatives, to be sure) or to the public or world (rather than just to Khrushchev), with full documentation and analysis of implications. (Nor does this occur to anyone else; see Garthoff on study, for which he was rapporteur, of implications of new intelligence. No one considers for a moment reeducating Congress, media, public, reconsidering whole Cold War posture, prospects of negotiating CTB or halt in missile testing and deployment. Only, like myself, what it means for Berlin; nor do they/I go further after Berlin seems resolved, or after Cuban Missile Crisis. JFK doesn't even admit full

extent of his error on the missile gap (Rhodes still uses figure of 50 SU missiles in 1961 in his 1995 book on H-bomb.) I would have gone to prison; and I should have done it, at point when it was clear that Administration wasn't really adjusting policies to reflect discovery of this vast, long-term error and of the reality. Cost of our failure: 10,000 Soviet ICBM warheads...

--Write thesis on "Risk, Ambiguity and Decision": 18-20-hour days, to make deadline of Ph.D. by my Tenth Reunion in June. (Kathryn) (After article on this in 1961, gotten out of me by Tom Schelling, who threatens to publish 1959? draft): The "Ellsberg Paradox." (x new entries on this on Web this year) [WEB]

✓ --Washington consulting: redraft Ann Arbor speech (!), write many comments on Rostow's BNSP, write comments for Gilpatric on new JSCP.

✓ Chapter 14: Nuclear Crises (I): The Cuban Missile Crisis

Chapter 15: Nuclear Crises (II)

--Preoccupation with nuclear crises, crisis decision-making, as the path to nuclear war. (And on inference, following upon thesis; I don't publish thesis--as I didn't publish Art of Coercion--don't take time to cut it down...)

✓ --NATO planning; speech for McNamara, Economic Club, and for Paris NATO meeting ("The image of a conventional Goliath facing a David armed with a nuclear sling is a myth"); trip to Paris with Harry (leaving Yvonne--I met that spring?-- waiting at hotel, and Carol unable to reach me about Robert's injury); I break up with Yvonne. [WEB]

✓ --I consult with Neustadt (mention his book's influence earlier in 1961) on his Skybolt Study (having already--or was it the following year?--consulted with Halperin on his study of the Taiwan Straits Crisis). [WEB: classified version, showing deletions]

✓ --JFK ambivalence on proliferation, urge to help France to improve relations; "Aside from Germany, who else will follow example?" On November 22, I read memo from McG B, JFK has decided to let France use Test Site. (See final French testing in 1995; example for India and Pakistan in 1998). I'm disgusted: another example of his waffling, that disgusted USAF from other direction on Cuba ("he follows advice of last person in his office") (not true, exactly: but see JFK pattern of complicated compromises, commitments on future action to avoid current action...)

--Yarmolinsky offers to make me his deputy; I decide to take job; Kennedy shot; all hoped-for gains from Kennedy being given up (McNamara has back-pedalled on nuclear plans, toward Mutual Assured Destruction). Later, I'm defensive and negative toward David Wise and others who criticize Bundy and McNamara for staying on with LBJ; I'm inclined to minimize differences between JFK and LBJ, or favor LBJ (see my Quagmire Myth). Thus I underrate or overlook big differences in their Vietnam policies.

(↓ didn't know JFK's; until 1967 (PP, RFK))

--That afternoon (or a day or two later? I think the same day), we consult on suggestions for a speech to Congress by LBJ.

--During JFK funeral, I read Neustadt study (which JFK had just read, given to Jackie to read, and intended to discuss with Neustadt on his return).

--I turn down Yarmolinsky (job goes to Vance's assistant, ^{Califano} who later replaces Yarmolinsky and then is Secretary of HUD under LBJ).

Chapter 16: Nuclear Crises (III)

--1964 study of nuclear crises. Set up by Schelling, under Walt Rostow.

--Study of Cuban Missile Crisis, various CIA versions (with different clearances) and WSEG

--Problem getting access to WSEG studies on Laos and Cuba and...;

--Suez (in Eyes Only vault of State, where I see Eisenhower/Bulganin/Khrushchev and JFK/Khrushchev private letters; new view of role of President, and relation to leader of SU (vs. traditional view of Ike/Dulles, as in Herman Finer book on Suez) (also see British ignorance of Suez, given Eden's lies).

--U-2 crisis (talk to Bissell). Wise-Ross book.

--Develop theory of Faits Malaccomplis, effects of secrecy and deception on surprise and rage and violent responses in the origins of crises and the risk of nuclear war.

--SI, T and K, and operational clearances for U-2 (Ideal?). (When had I earlier gotten SI clearance? I think under Schelling study on Presidential command and control, Partridge Task Force in 1961 (what I didn't have then was T and K). (See Leibman slip, Kaysen comment, and Marshall advice: latter, prior to Partridge?) I.e.: discuss secrecy system...

Chapter 17: Proliferation

✓ --Chinese bomb

✓ --Harry's planning for preventive strike (see later: 1969)

✓ --India's secret request for nuclear explosion; Rusk's attitude; our reaction in ISA

✓ --Gilpatric Committee, rejecting Rusk's position, laying out anti-proliferation program (still unperformed, still urgent), ignored by LBJ (week of Rolling Thunder)

--Recall JFK ambivalence on proliferation; urge to assist France; final decision to help (see above). ✓
MLF. Israel (LBJ). Later, attitude of Nixon and Kissinger. Vagueness in NPT. (See 1995; and now, India-Pakistan!)

Chapter 18: Nixon, Nucs and Me

Chapter 19: First Use

-- History of US nuclear first-use threats, and discovery of it by DE (effort to expose it: largely unsuccessful). DE horror at first-use threats and plans, but complicity. (*Reluctance*)

Chapter 19: Anti-Nuclear Activism

X --I try to interest media in nuclear revelations (after failing to recover documents): Cronkhite, Schachne, Woodward and Bernstein. Alice Mayhew rejects book based on Nesson transcripts ("It would only sell 1600 copies...that means we wouldn't publish it.")

✓ --I hope to help launch a movement against nuclear weapons comparable to antiwar movement.

✓ --Continental Walk for Peace and Social Justice, 1976; Ends in Washington, fall 1976 (my first arrest, at Pentagon, for civil disobedience: except for PP).

✓ --Organization of Mobilization for Survival in early 1977 (pushed by Sid Lens and his book, and Berrigans in jail); push focus on nuclear weapons (against appeal by McReynolds).

✓ --Deployment of neutron bomb to Europe announced; ^{*conley*} Paul dies; I'm invited to Rocky Flats, and anti-N-bomb rallies in Amsterdam and Europe _{*Jacobs*}

Epilogue

Chapter 20: The Secrecy System

--Mechanics of the secrecy system

--how is all of this kept from the public?

*(admits to false statements:
There is another way.
Kuntzschow)*

Chapter 21: Reflections on Evil, Morality and Human Survival

✓ --Madness and pathology of the nuclear arms race, and its unrecognized dangers (reflected in my pre-Vietnam work on nuclear command and control, planning and crises).

~ --The role of institutional behavior--obedience, commitment to secrecy, deference, conformity, priority to institutional interests--in support of madness, criminality and evil.

--Potential role of personal risk-taking and of truth-telling in averting disasters and preserving life. The importance of willingness to defy authority, at the cost of risk to career and personal security, reputation, associations, family security and stability. For democracy to function and for civil society to show its full value in averting catastrophe and end moral disasters, there is need for activism: for risk-taking and truth-telling initiatives by individuals and groups both outside and to some extent within the state and corporate structures. (See me, and the truth-tellers from within the tobacco companies).

Congress; Ant & sec 8; hearings; budget

Chapter 22: The Current Nuclear Danger, and How to Reduce It

--Analysis of post-Vietnam nuclear politics; first use threats; proliferation

--New dangers of proliferation to and use by terrorist groups

--Manhattan Project II, how to fix the system, make us safer